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DRMAND PRIVACY 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The future of privacy is increasingly linked to the future of copyright 
enforcement. In an effort to control the proliferation of unauthorized cop-
ies, and to maximize profit from information goods distributed over the 
Internet, copyright owners and their technology partners are designing 
digital rights management ("DRM") technologies that will allow more 
perfect control over access to and use of digital files. The same capabili-
ties that enable more perfect control also implicate the privacy interests of 
users of information goods. Although DRM technologies vary considera-
bly, at the most general level they represent an effort to reshape the prac-
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tices and spaces of intellectual consumption. They also create the potential 
for vastly increased collection of information about individuals' intellec-
tual habits and preferences. These technologies therefore affect both spa-
tial and informational dimensions of the privacy that individuals customar-
ily have enjoyed in their intellectual activity. Quite apart from the ques-
tions of intellectual property policy that surround DRM technologies, then, 
the proper balance between DRM and user privacy is an important ques-
tion in its own right. 
Interrogating the relationship between copyright enforcement and pri-
vacy raises deeper questions about the nature of privacy and what counts, 
or ought to count, as privacy invasion in the age of networked digital tech-
nologies. This Article begins, in Part II, by identifying the privacy inter-
ests that individuals enjoy in their intellectual activities and exploring the 
different ways in which certain implementations of DRM technologies 
may threaten those interests. Part III considers the appropriate scope of 
legal protection for privacy in the context of DRM, and argues that both 
the common law of privacy and an expanded conception of consumer pro-
tection law have roles to play in protecting the privacy of information us-
ers. 
As Parts II and III demonstrate, consideration of how the theory and 
law of privacy should respond to the development and implementation of 
DRM technologies also raises the reverse question: How should the devel-
opment and implementation of DRM technologies respond to privacy the-
ory and law? As artifacts designed to regulate user behavior, DRM tech-
nologies already embody value choices. Might privacy itself become one 
of the values embodied in DRM design? Part IV argues that with some 
conceptual and procedural adjustments, DRM technologies and related 
standard-setting processes could be harnessed to preserve and protect pri-
vacy. 
II. PRIVACY INTERESTS IN INTELLECTUAL 
CONSUMPTION 
DRM technologies operate at the intersection of two complex and 
powerful constellations of privacy values. They target a set of behaviors, 
which I will label intellectual consumption, that often (though not always) 
take place within private spaces. These behaviors, in tum, concern an ac-
tivity-intellectual exploration-that is widely regarded as quintessen-
tially private. The nexus between intellectual exploration and private 
physical space is an important factor in the analysis of intellectual privacy. 
Properly understood, an individual's interest in intellectual privacy has 
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both spatial and infonnational aspects. At its core, this interest concerns 
the extent of "breathing space," both metaphorical and physical, available 
for intellectual activity. DRM technologies may threaten breathing space 
by collecting infonnation about intellectual consumption (and therefore 
exploration) or by imposing direct constraints on these activities. 
A. The Dimensions of Intellectual Privacy 
Two distinct strands of privacy theory infonn, and delineate the con-
tours of, the individual interest in intellectual privacy. These strands con-
verge to define a zone of privacy for intellectual activity that has physical 
as well as conceptual dimensions. Specifically, the individual interest in 
intellectual privacy extends both to infonnation about intellectual con-
sumption and exploration and to the physical and temporal circumstances 
of intellectual consumption within private spaces. 
As conventionally understood, interests in intellectual privacy derive 
from interests in personal autonomy, and are primarily infonnational. 
Within Western societies, a central tenet of post-Enlightenment thought is 
the inviolability of each individual's rights over her own person. These 
rights include not only rights of bodily integrity and other corporeal rights, 
but also rights over one's own thoughts and personality. I Surveillance and 
compelled disclosure of infonnation about intellectual consumption 
threaten rights of personal integrity and self-definition in subtle but power-
ful ways. Although a person cannot be prohibited from thinking as she 
chooses, persistent, fine-grained observation subtly shapes behavior, ex-
pression, and ultimately identity? The inexorable pressure toward confor-
mity generated by exposure, and by loss of control over uses of the gath-
ered infonnation, violates rights of self-detennination by coopting them. 
1. See, e.g., GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 1942) 
(1821); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 
1996) (1797); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) 
(1690). 
2. See, e.g., Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHI-
LOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 223 (Ferdinand David Schoeman 
ed., 1984) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY]; Jeffrey H. Reiman, 
Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra, 
at 300; Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 723, 754-55 (1999); 
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 
STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1424-28 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives]; Julie E. 
Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in 
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 1006-14 (1996) [hereinafter Cohen, A Right to Read 
Anonymously]; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); 
Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and 
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1,59-71 (1991). 
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Additionally, surveillance and exposure devalue the fundamental dignity 
of persons by reducing the exposed individuals to the sum of their "pro-
files.,,3 For these reasons, in circumstances where records of intellectual 
consumption are routinely generated-libraries, video rental memberships, 
and cable subscriptions-socie7 has adopted legal measures to protect 
these records against disclosure. Privacy rights in information about intel-
lectual activities and preferences preserve the privacy interest in (meta-
phoric) breathing space for thought, exploration, and personal growth. 
The second strand of privacy theory that relates to intellectual privacy 
concerns privacy within physical spaces. Within Western societies, tradi-
tion and social practice reserve certain types of "private space" to the indi-
vidual or the family. Chief among these is the home, which is conceived 
as a place of retreat from the eyes of the outside world.5 Some privacy 
skeptics argue that rules about entitlements to privacy within certain 
spaces overlap substantially with lroperty-based entitlements to control 
access to private homes or offices. Yet the correspondence between own-
ership and spatial privacy is imperfect. Not every invasion of a residential 
property interest is an invasion of privacy; for example, most people do 
not think that a nuisance, such as excessive noise or noxious fumes, is also 
a privacy invasion.7 And individuals can have privacy expectations in 
spaces that they do not own or rent, such as public restrooms, dressing 
3. See Benn, supra note 2; cf JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DE-
STRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000) (arguing that privacy protects the individual 
interest in not being judged "out of context"); Radhika Rao, A Veil o/Genetic Ignorance? 
Protecting Privacy as a Mechanism to Ensure Equality (2003) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the author) (arguing that privacy is grounded in equality interests). 
4. See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-618 (codified at 18 
U.S.c. § 2710 (2000)); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-549 (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.c. § 551 (2000)); Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra, note 2, at 
1031 n.213 (collecting state statutes safeguarding the privacy of library patrons). 
5. Commentators differ on how far back in time this tradition extends, and it is also 
true that wealthier individuals, families, and groups, who can more easily afford to pur-
chase space, historically have enjoyed more of this sort of privacy. Nonetheless, com-
mitment to (varying degrees of) spatial privacy is at least a distinguishing characteristic 
of modern societies. 
6. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DI-
MENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 272. 
7. Cf Gavison, supra note 2, at 436-39 ("There are no good reasons ... to expect 
any similarity between intrusive smells or noises and modes of acquiring information 
about or access to an individual."); Ferdinand David Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical 
Dimensions of the Literature, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, supra note 2, 
at 1, 27-28 (demonstrating that not every privacy invasion directed at private property 
also invades the property interest). 
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rooms, and telephone booths.8 Acknowledgment of these expectations 
suggests a fairly broad consensus that the interests protected by "privacy" 
and "property" are different. Rules. and traditions about freedom within 
private spaces concern not only property interests, but also guarantees of 
literal, physical breathing space for individual behavior. Sheltered behav-
iors may include both those that are aberrant when measured against some 
dominant social norm and those that simply are not intended for general 
public consumption. One may, for example, walk around nude inside 
one's own home, even though one is not free to do so in public. 
Among the behaviors shielded by spatial privacy are those relating to 
activities of the mind. Just as spatial privacy allows for physical nudity, so 
it also allows for metaphorical nudity; behind closed doors, one may shed 
the situational personae that one adopts with co-workers, neighbors, fel-
low commuters, or social acquaintances, and become at once more trans-
parent and more complex than any of those personae allows.9 Spatial pri-
vacy affords the freedom to explore areas of intellectual interest that one 
might not feel as free to explore in public. It also affords the freedom to 
dictate the circumstances-the when, where, how, and how often-of 
one's own intellectual consumption, unobserved and unobstructed by oth-
ers. In many nonprivate spaces, this freedom is absent or compromised. 
For example, one may enter a library or a bookstore only during business 
hours, and copyright law restricts the ability to watch movies on the prem-
ises of video rental establishments. 1o The essence of the privacy that pri-
vate space affords for intellectual consumption is the absence of such lim-
8. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy while using a public telephone booth); Doe by Doe v. 
B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that surreptitious video-
taping of fashion models in their dressing room was an invasion of privacy); Benitez v. 
KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 714 N.E.2d 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that female em-
ployees' allegations that employer spied on them through hole in ceiling of women's rest-
room stated a claim for invasion of privacy); Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1983) (holding that installation of hidden viewing device in public restroom at skat-
ing rink invaded privacy). But see Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812 
(N.D. 1998) (no invasion of privacy where employee only unintentionally observed man 
masturbating in public restroom); Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that rights of privacy in store restrooms may be outweighed by 
store's interest in deterring crime). 
9. Cf ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) 
(exploring the different ways in which individuals present themselves in different con-
texts); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32-42 (1970) (arguing that privacy en-
ables breathing space for emotional release, autonomous development, and self-
evaluation). 
10. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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its. The interest in unfettered intellectual exploration includes an interest 
in the unfettered ability to use and enjoy intellectual goods within those 
spaces.11 
B. DRM Technologies and Intellectual Privacy 
DRM technologies are poised to affect both the spatial and the infor-
mational dimensions of intellectual privacy. Both by directly constraining 
private behaviors related to intellectual consumption and by enabling crea-
tion of detailed and permanent records of such consumption, these tech-
nologies have the potential to change dramatically the way people experi-
ence intellectual goods. Whether they will do so in a way that undermines 
either set of intellectual privacy values is an important question. To an-
swer it, we must consider each of the general functions that a DRM tech-
nology might perform. 
1. Constraint 
Some DRM technologies are designed to set and automatically enforce 
limits on user behavior. For example, a music delivery format might pre-
vent copying, including copying for "space-shifting" purposes, or might 
restrict the types of devices that can be used for playback.12 The "content 
scrambling system" (eSS) algorithm used on DVDs does both of these 
things, and also implements a "region coding" compatibility system de-
signed to ensure that DVDs intended for use in one geographic region 
(e.g., North America) cannot be played on equipment sold elsewhere. 13 
Technologies that constrain user behavior narrow the zone of freedom 
traditionally enjoyed for activities in private spaces, and in particular for 
activities relating to intellectual consumption within those spaces. In so 
11. Cj Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563-65 (1969) (recognizing "the right to 
satisfy [one's] intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of [one's] own home"). Out 
of an abundance of caution, I should note that this interest in unrestricted intellectual con-
sumption neither presupposes nor implies a broader interest in wholly unrestricted behav-
ior that would shield, for example, crimes against persons committed in private spaces. 
12. See Amy Harmon, CD-Protection Complaint Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
2002, at C8; P.J. Huffstutter & Jon Healey, Suit Filed Against Record Firms, L.A. TIMES, 
June 14,2002, at C3; Brenda Sandburg, Milberg Weiss Weighs In Over No-Copy Audio: 
Discs Are Misleading and Defective, Suit Says, THE RECORDER, June 17, 2002, at 1; Joe 
Wilcox, Microsoft Protecting Rights-Or Windows?, CNET NEWS.COM (Feb. 3, 2003), 
at http://news/com.com!21 00-1 023-9830 17 .htrnl. 
13. See Matt Lake, How It Works: Tweaking Technology to Stay Ahead of the Film 
Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,2001, at G9; Doug Mellgren, Acquittal in DVD Decoding: 
Norwegian Teen Created Program So He Could View Film on Computer, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Jan. 8, 2003, at 3D; John Borland, Studios Race to Choke DVD Copying, 
CNET NEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2002), at http://news.com.com!2100-1023-828449.htrnl. 
HeinOnline -- 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 581 2003
2003] DRM AND PRIVACY 581 
doing, they decrease the level of autonomy that users enjoy with respect to 
the terms of use and enjoyment of intellectual goods. Does this constric-
tion also amount to an invasion (or, more neutrally, a lessening) of pri-
vacy? That depends on how privacy and its absence are defined. 
It is hard to argue that a copy-protection device "intrudes on seclu-
sion" in the precise manner contemplated by the Prosserian tort of that 
name. 14 The tort theory of spatial privacy envisions "seclusion" as physi-
cal isolation from human observation. The sort of intrusion cognizable as 
privacy invasion generally involves direct human agency and at least the 
possibility of a human observer. 15 Technologies of direct constraint, in 
contrast, operate automatically and without recourse to an external con-
troller. But to say that these technologies therefore cannot "intrude" begs 
the question whether standards devised by courts to remedy invasions of 
private space in the predigital age should be the touchstone for assessing 
diminutions of spatial privacy in the digital age. A less precedent-bound 
conceptualization of privacy might frame matters differently. 
More abstractly, many philosophers conceive of "privacy" as a condi-
tion of inaccessibility or limited accessibility to the rest of the world. 16 In-
vasions of privacy involve rendering the individual more accessible to 
others in some way. Technologies of direct constraint do not map espe-
cially well to this theory, either. Copy-control restrictions and similar con-
straints do not render individuals who purchase restricted works more ac-
cessible to others in any particularized way; they simply carry out their 
assigned tasks. If I buy a copy-protected music CD and play it in my liv-
ing room, I and my living room are no more accessible to the copyright 
owners of the various musical works and sound recordings than the day 
before I made my purchase. 
Conceptualizing loss of privacy in terms of either intrusion or particu-
larized accessibility, however, misses an important aspect of the dynamic 
established by DRM technologies of direct constraint. From an informa-
14. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 
1984); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383,389 (1960) (summarizing evo-
lution of privacy causes of action). 
15. See, e.g., Ass'n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454,459 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that trespassing upon private property while conducting surveillance could con-
stitute intrusion upon seclusion); Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.c. App. 1996) 
(holding that placing a video camera in plaintiffs bedroom and going through his mail 
could constitute intrusion upon seclusion); Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 
App. 2001) (holding that placing a video camera in plaintiffs bedroom could constitute 
intrusion upon seclusion). 
16. See, e.g., ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SO-
CIETY (1988); Gavison, supra note 2, at 423; Schoeman, supra note 2, at 2-4. 
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tion provider's perspective, there are several possible ways to respond to 
the problem of policing user behavior under conditions of limited accessi-
bility. One is to develop DRM technologies that enable surveillance; those 
technologies are discussed below. Another-the strategy of direct con-
straint considered here-is to restrict the range of permitted behaviors in a 
way that is known ex ante, thereby eliminating any need for intrusive 
monitoring. 17 This strategy subverts the logic of privacy-as-inaccessibility. 
I and my living room may be no more accessible to the copyright owners 
of the copy-protected music CD than before I bought it, but that does not 
matter; the feasible uses of the CD are known, and so the question of par-
ticularized accessibility to me is moot. Yet from an information user's per-
spective, it is hard to see the result as non-invasive; if anything, it is more 
efficiently invasive than a surveillance strategy would be. 
Focusing narrowly on "intrusion" or "accessibility" also ignores the 
complex intersectionality of the privacy concerns implicated by DRM 
technologies. This approach reduces even the interest in spatial privacy to 
a primarily informational one, and excludes consideration of the other in-
tellectual privacy values that spatial privacy serves. In particular, as al-
ready noted, intellectual privacy resides partly in the ability to exert (a rea-
sonable degree of) control over the physical and temporal circumstances 
of intellectual consumption within private spaces. This argument has 
points of commonality with a strand of privacy theory that emphasizes de-
cisional autonomy as the basis for at least some privacy rights. Some phi-
losophers argue that where certain deeply personal activities are con-
cerned, privacy denotes not only a condition of (relative) inaccessibility, 
but also a zone of noninterference with individual choice. 18 The usual ex-
amples relate to rights to control one's own person (e.g., decisions about 
reproduction, or about intimate relationships), but one might extend the 
argument to encompass rights to control one's own intellectual develop-
ment. My argument that intellectual privacy resides, in part, in freedom 
from physical or architectural constraint diverges from those arguments to 
17. Cf LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (elabo-
rating the ways in which the architecture of digital spaces and networks regulates behav-
ior); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REv. 553 (1998) (arguing that lawmakers and regulators 
should take the regulatory function of digital architectures into account when formulating 
information policy). 
18. See, e.g., JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1992); Judith 
Wagner DeCew, The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics, 5 LAW & PHIL. 145 (1986). 
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the extent that it is grounded in the nexus between protected activity and 
protected space. 19 
One might argue that a claim right to noninterference defines a liberty 
interest, not a privacy interest.2o But this objection misses the point. Pri-
vacy and liberty interests may overlap, but that does not render privacy 
claims identical to liberty claims. The interest in noninterference with be-
haviors of intellectual consumption within private spaces is not "simply" a 
matter of (negative) liberty, but also and more fundamentally a matter of 
the ability to exert positive control over an activity fundamental to self-
definition.21 Technologies of direct constraint shape individual practices of 
intellectual consumption in ways that shift the locus of choice about those 
practices away from the individual. At least when such practices occur 
within private spaces, then, these technologies implicate privacy interests. 
More specifically, the conjunction of constitutive activity and protected 
place generates a privacy interest in the ability to pursue the activity free 
from (at least some degree of) constraint. 
19. Thus, for example, my argument would not necessarily support a claimed pri-
vacy interest in gaining physical access to Borders at three in the morning. It is worth 
reiterating, however, that the home is not the only sort of space in which this interest in 
freedom from constraint exists. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part 
IILA.I.a). Note also that 1 do not intend to suggest that individuals have no decisional 
autonomy interests whatsoever in intellectual activity outside private spaces; that is a 
separate question. 
20. See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 2, at 438-39. For other scholars who are generally 
skeptical of privacy claims, the failure of privacy scholars to agree on a single definition 
of privacy signals a fundamental weakness in the notion of "privacy" as an independent 
philosophical concept. See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 6. Arguably, though, recourse to 
multiple, sometimes overlapping, definitions of privacy is entirely reasonable and does 
not weaken the case that privacy interests exist. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualiz-
ing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087 (2002) (suggesting a pragmatic, family-of-concepts 
approach to privacy). That is the general view that 1 adopt here. The virtues and vices of 
definitional consistency are subjects for another article. Since this Article addresses pri-
vacy in the particular context of intellectual property enforcement, however, 1 cannot 
resist noting that recourse to multiple, sometimes overlapping, definitions of "property" 
and its entailments does not seem to trouble some of the same commentators nearly as 
much. 
2l. Cj DeCew, supra note 18, at 165: 
[C]ertain personal decisions regarding one's basic lifestyle ... should 
be viewed as liberty cases in view of their concern over decision-
making power, whereas privacy is at stake because of the nature of the 
decision .... [I]t is no criticism or conflation of concepts to say that an 
act can be both a theft and a trespass. Similarly, acknowledging that in 
some cases there is both an invasion of privacy and a violation of lib-
erty need not confuse those concepts. 
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One also might object that defining intellectual privacy to encompass 
the absence of constraint makes every product design decision a privacy 
problem, and that this result does not square with the realities of the com-
petitive marketplace. According to this view, DRM technologies of con-
straint, like any other new consumer product feature, simply create for us-
ers new realities around which to exercise (fewer remaining) choices. 
This, though, presumes that "product design" results from a confluence of 
neutraVtechnical factors exogenous to social policy. Exactly the opposite 
is true. Product design reflects social as well as "technical" values--or 
perhaps more precisely, technical considerations cannot help but reflect 
social ones.22 For an example, one need look no farther than DRM tech-
nologies themselves; design for maximum constraint reflects commercial 
and (anti)competitive objectives. 
To the extent that product design is inherently a social enterprise, there 
is no reason to say that privacy does not "belong" in the calculus of factors 
that inform and constrain design. To the contrary, if intellectual privacy is 
an important human value and product design implicates that value, then 
product design is a privacy issue, and rightly SO.23 Sometimes privacy val-
ues will receive only partial accommodation; one cannot say that privacy 
is the only relevant design consideration. But one can articulate as an ex-
plicit norm of the design process the goal of minimizing privacy-invasive 
constraints. As I discuss in greater detail in Part IV, injecting this norm 
into the DRM design process might produce DRM technologies that look 
substantially different. 
2. Monitoring 
Other DRM technologies are designed to report back to the informa-
tion provider on the activities of individual users. Such reporting may oc-
cur in conjunction with a pay-per-use arrangement for access to the work, 
or it may occur independently of payment terms. For example, monitoring 
functionality might be designed to collect data about use of the work that 
might reveal user preferences for particular types of content.24 Monitoring 
22. See, e.g., WIEBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND BULBS: TOWARD A 
THEORY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995); DONALD MACKENZIE, KNOWING MA-
CHINES: ESSAYS ON TECHNICAL CHANGE (W.E. Bijker et al. eds. 1996); LANGDON WIN-
NER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECH-
NOLOGY (1986). 
23. The point extends, as well, to other privacy values, but that is not my focus here. 
24. For examples of this type of monitoring functionality, see Specht v. Netscape 
Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (involving alleged invasion of pri-
vacy by use of browser "plug-in" to monitor online activity); In re RealNetworks, Inc., 
Privacy Litig., No. 00-1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) (involving privacy 
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also can be used to determine information about related products, such as 
the presence of non-copy-protected MP3 files on the user's hard drive or 
the other computer programs a user is running in conjunction with a li-
censed program.25 
DRM technologies that monitor user behavior create records of intel-
lectual consumption. Indirectly, then, they create records of intellectual 
exploration, one of the most personal and private of activities. They also 
create records of behavior within private spaces, spaces within which one 
might reasonably expect that one's behavior is not subject to observation. 
These technologies fall straightforwardly within conventional understand-
ings of privacy invasion. Gathering information about intellectual con-
sumption renders intellectual preferences accessible, both to the informa-
tion provider and to third parties that might purchase it or invoke legal 
process to compel its production. And to the extent that behaviors within 
private spaces become accessible, or potentially accessible, to the outside 
world, the individual has lost a portion of the privacy that seclusion ought 
to guarantee. 
Much of this record-keeping activity is conducted automatically, with-
out the direct involvement of a human observer or controller, but the fact 
of automation does not necessarily neutralize the threat to privacy inter-
ests. The relevant question, instead, is whether information about intellec-
tual consumption is gathered and stored in a form that is both personally-
identifiable and potentially accessible to others.26 If the information exists 
in such a form, it is subject to disclosure or compelled production. Absent 
stringent privacy protections (of which more later), the threat of disclosure 
may chill intellectual exploration, and therefore compromise intellectual 
privacy interests. 
claims regarding media player software that monitored and stored information about us-
ers' electronic communications); cf In re Pharmatrak, Inc., Privacy Litig., 220 F. Supp. 
2d 4 (D. Mass. 2002) (discussing use of "cookies" to collect personal information about 
web site users); In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (same); John Borland, A Secret War: Spike in "Spyware" Accelerates Arms Race, 
CNET NEWS. COM (Feb. 24, 2003), at http://news.com.coml2102-1023-985524.html (de-
scribing recent developments in use of web-based technologies to gather information 
about habits and preferences ofIntemet users). 
25. See Mark Prigg & Avril Williams, Spies Behind Your Screen, TIMES (London), 
Aug. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 23215148; see also Borland, supra note 24 (describ-
ing wide variety of information discoverable through use of monitoring software); Robert 
Lemos, Trust or Treachery? Security Technologies Could Baclifire Against Consumers, 
CNETNEWS.COM (Nov. 7,2002), at http://news.com.coml2102-1001-964628.html. 
26. As noted in Part IV infra, techniques for' aggregating user data for marketing 
purposes may avoid or substantially mitigate this privacy threat. 
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DRM monitoring technologies also can have second-order privacy ef-
fects. Specifically, data gathered through monitoring can later be used to 
generate detailed profiles of users' revealed intellectual preferences. The 
information provider can use the resulting profiles to market additional 
information goods to users, or can sell it to third parties who may use it for 
a wide variety of other purposes?7 DRM monitoring technologies do not 
uniquely enable profiling, or even intellectual profiling; without any in-
formation about usage patterns, an information provider can construct a 
reasonably detailed profile of intellectual preferences and subject matter 
interests based solely on the information generated by initial purchase re-
cords. Nonetheless, the use of data gathered via DRM monitoring to "en-
hance" existing profiles renders those profiles more comprehensive, and 
thus potentially more invasive from the user's perspective. 
3. Self-Help 
Direct restriction protocols can be designed to encode penalties as well 
as disabilities. For example, a DRM system could be designed to disable 
access to a work upon detecting an attempt at unauthorized use.28 Such 
"self-help" technologies-so named because they are designed to obviate 
recourse to legal enforcement procedures-might be directed and con-
trolled externally upon detection of the prohibited activity. This type of 
functionality would need to be implemented in tandem with some sort of 
monitoring functionality. Self-help technologies also might operate auto-
matically upon internal detection of a triggering activity, without commu-
nication with any external system or controller. The extent to which either 
type of self-help functionality should be permissible as a matter of con-
tract law has been the subject of an ongoing dispute,29 but there appear to 
be no technical barriers to their implementation. 
DRM self-help technologies present a special case of the constraint 
problem, and potentially a special case of the monitoring problem as well. 
27. For good discussions of profiling and its uses, see OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE 
PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993); Jeff Sov-
em, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal In-
formation, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033 (1999). 
28. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Consumer Privacy in the E-Commerce Market-
place 2002, 3 INTERNET L. & Bus. 812 (2002), available at http://www.epic.org/epic/ 
stafflhoofnagle/ilbpaper.html (last visited May 5, 2003) (describing InTether's Point-to-
Point system). 
29. See VNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT [hereinafter VCITA] 605(f), 
816 cmt. 2 (amended 2002); UCITA 605(f), 816 cmt. 3 (amended 2001); VCITA 605, 
815-16, (Draft 1999); U.C.C. 2B-715, reporter's note 3 (Draft Aug. 1, 1998); V.e.e. 2B-
716 (Draft Apr. 15, 1998); V.c.e. 2B-716 (Draft Feb. 1998); see also Julie E. Cohen, 
Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, l3 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998). 
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For all of the reasons already discussed, I believe that it is analytically 
sound to conclude that both types of technologies have the potential sig-
nificantly to diminish privacy in intellectual consumption. There remains 
the question whether the inclusion of self-help functionality adds anything 
distinct to the privacy dynamic. 
The punitive quality of self-help implicates privacy interests in one 
way that technologies of direct constraint do not. The identification of a 
particular consumer as a target for self-help measures entails loss of the 
relative anonymi~ formerly enjoyed by that individual as one among 
many customers? Here too, DRM technologies give the dynamics of en-
forcement a slightly different spin. Enforcement, like constraint and moni-
toring, can be activated without direct human agency; thus, it is conceiv-
able that no human would ever know the specific identities of those sin-
gled out. Once again, though, conceptualizing loss of privacy in terms of 
human "attention" misses the distinctive sense in which the phenomenon 
of attention operates in the digital age. Attention and anonymity, or at least 
fungibility, may coexist. One can remain an anonymous customer and yet 
be singled out by a process of automated decisionmaking for conse-
quences that one would not choose. Whether a human or a computer di-
rected the decision, one's eBooks and MP3 files no longer "work," and no 
longer work as a result of actions taken privately. From the individual 
user's perspective, the consequences are the same regardless of whether a 
human or a computer made the final call to activate self-help measures. 
It is worth noting, finally, that the deployment ofDRM technologies of 
self-help, and more generally of constraint, also raises questions about the 
nature and function of the boundary between public and private spheres.3l 
By inserting automatic enforcement functions into private spaces and ac-
tivities, these technologies elide the difference between public/rule-
governed behavior and private behavior that is far more loosely circum-
scribed by applicable rules and social norms. Some offenses, most notably 
crimes against persons, are so severe that they may justify such elision. In 
other cases, however, looseness of fit between public rules and private be-
havior serves valuable purposes. Where privacy enables individuals to 
avoid the more onerous aspects of social norms to which they may not 
30. See Gavison, supra note 2, at 432-33 ("An individual always loses privacy when 
he becomes the subject of attention."). 
31. "Public" and "private" are terms with multiple meanings. I use "private" here 
not to denote non-state activities, but simply to denote spaces not open to the general 
public and behaviors not intended for the general public, including private intellectual 
activities. I use "public" to denote conduct that occurs outside these realms. 
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fully subscribe, it promotes tolerance and pluralism.32 Where the precise 
contours of legal rules are unclear, or the proper application of legal rules 
to particular facts is contested, privacy shields a range of experimentation 
with different behaviors that furthers the value-balancing goals of public 
policy. Highly restrictive DRM technologies do not permit this experimen-
tation, and eliminate public policy and privacy alike from the calculus of 
infraction and 'enforcement. That these technologies, represent, at most, a 
novel form of distributed/decentralized authoritarianism seems cold com-
fort. Here again, privacy interests and liberty interests overlap, but are dis-
tinct. Privacy shields self-constitutive decisions and activities from inter-
ference, and protects liberty as well.33 
* * * 
Thus far, I have concentrated solely on identifying and elaborating in-
dividual interests in intellectual privacy, without considering whether or 
how society should protect those interests. The discussion has, however, 
identified two possible points of entry for the project of protecting intel-
lectual privacy. First, law might translate intellectual privacy interests into 
enforceable rights by providing legal claims and remedies for (at least 
some) invasions of those interests. Second, privacy values might be intro-
duced into the design process for DRM technologies. The remainder of the 
Article explores these possibilities. 
III. BUILDING INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY INTO LAW 
Articulating legal principles for protecting the intellectual privacy in-
terests implicated by DRM technologies is far more complicated than ar-
ticulating the normative case for such protection. Normative theories are 
more supple than legal ones, which tend to move cautiously along well-
trodden paths. Developing a legal theory of intellectual privacy for the in-
formation age requires an act of legal imagination. Because no single 
branch of legal doctrine supplies all of the elements necessary for effective 
protection of intellectual privacy, such a theory must synthesize elements 
from a variety of different legal traditions. It also must confront directly a 
problem that each of these doctrinal traditions has steadfastly avoided: de-
termining what conditions should be necessary for an effective waiver of 
32. Cj James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1 
(1995) (elaborating the role of constitutionally protected privacy in securing a realm of 
"deliberative autonomy"). 
33. See DeCew, supra note 18, at 172; supra Part II.B.!. A more detailed explora-
tion of the relationship(s) between architectural constraint, privacy, and freedom is be-
yond the scope of this Article. 
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intellectual privacy if protection for intellectual privacy is to be meaning-
ful. At both stages, the theory must be justified as an act of legal imagina-
tion. That is to say, it should be possible to show (capitulating at least par-
tially to law's inherent conservatism) that it at least does not differ too 
greatly from other such imaginative leaps. 
A. Crafting Legal Privacy Standards for the Information Age 
Many different strands of law bear to some degree on questions of in-
tellectual privacy, but none is exactly developed to address the unique pri-
vacy problems created by DRM technologies. Several, however, have the 
potential to do so. The common law of privacy, with its emphasis on con-
trol over personal spaces, private facts, and commercialization of image, 
can be reconfigured for the digital age by drawing on the policy and nor-
mative frameworks embodied in other privacy-regarding areas of law. In 
addition, because many infonnation goods are also consumer goods, a 
more explicitly regulatory approach to privacy-invasive DRM technolo-
gies, grounded in principles of consumer protection law, can significantly 
improve levels of protection for intellectual privacy. 
1. The Common Law Privacy Torts 
The initial theory of common law privacy protection articulated by 
Warren and Brandeis was fairly flexible: a general "right to be let 
alone. ,,34 The difficulty with this new right lay precisely in its generality 
and vagueness; without a more detailed specification, the right to be let 
alone could conceivably encompass almost any kind of unwanted atten-
tion. By the mid-twentieth century, aided by legal scholarship seeking to 
subdue Warren and Brandeis' unruly brainchild, the common law of pri-
vacy had congealed into four distinct tortS.35 The price of clarity, however, 
was stasis. Three of these torts-intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of 
name or likeness, and public disclosure of private facts-are potentially 
applicable to the privacy problems created by DRM technologies, but all 
have remained finnly focused on the privacy problems of the predigital 
age. Yet each is potentially flexible enough to cover far more-if only 
courts become convinced that the expansion is warranted. 
34. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 
193,193 (1890). 
35. See KEETON, supra note 14, at § 117 (describing torts of appropriation of name 
or likeness, intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and public por-
trayal in a false light); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) (same); 
Prosser, supra note 14. The tort-based theory of pUblicity rights was not included in this 
group, but emerged later and has proved more adaptable. See infra Part III.A.1.b. 
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Current applications of the common law privacy torts do not readily 
encompass the sorts of incursions worked by DRM technologies. As noted 
in Part II, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion has targeted physical or 
audiovisual intrusions into private spaces.36 No court has considered 
whether it similarly protects against the insertion of other kinds of sensors 
(e.g., DRM monitoring technologies), or sensors that report back to ma-
chines rather than to people, or technologies that drastically constrain be-
havior, but without reporting back. Each of these conclusions requires an 
additional step away from the traditional core of the tort. The fit between 
current conceptions of the other common law privacy torts and informa-
tional privacy concerns is equally imperfect. The tort of appropriation of 
name or likeness has focused primarily on misuse of proper names and 
pictorial images for advertising purposes. So far, when asked to apply this 
tort to the digital "likenesses" generated by profiling and data mining ac-
tivities, courts have resisted.37 The tort prohibiting public disclosure of 
private facts has generally been applied in cases involving publication of 
embarrassing sexual, health-related or financial information, not the sale 
of information about intellectual habits and preferences.38 All three of 
36. See, e.g., Ass'n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that trespassing upon private property while conducting surveillance could con-
stitute intrusion upon seclusion); Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. App. 1996) 
(holding that placing a video camera in plaintiff's bedroom and going through his mail 
could constitute intrusion upon seclusion); Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 
App. 2001) (holding that placing a video camera in plaintiff's bedroom could constitute 
intrusion upon seclusion). 
37. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(holding that credit card company did not appropriate cardholders' names or likenesses 
by renting lists of their names characterized by purchasing patterns); Avrahami v. U.S. 
News & World Report, Inc., No. 96-203, slip op. at 6-7 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996) 
(holding that media company did not appropriate customer's name or likeness by selling 
information about him). This resistance is particularly incongruous in light of the fact that 
courts have shown relatively little restraint in expanding celebrity rights of publicity to 
cover new digital manifestations. See infra Part III.A.l.b. 
38. See, e.g., Bratt v. IBM Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 1984) (allowing claim for 
publication of private facts where results of employee's psychiatric tests were disclosed 
to co-workers and supervisors); Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) 
(holding that plaintiff stated prima facie case of publication of private facts where anti-
abortion protesters displayed her name outside an abortion clinic); Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp., 
795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs stated claim for publication 
of private facts where information about their participation in hospital in vitro fertiliza-
tion program was televised). There are some signs, however, of increasing judicial recep-
tiveness to application of this tort to commercial profiling involving information per-
ceived as especially sensitive. See Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-0897F, 
slip op. at 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 29, 1999) (denying defense motion for summary 
judgment on claim that it invaded plaintiffs' privacy by selling information about their 
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these torts, however, are capable of a broader and more sensitive applica-
tion. 
Conceptual support for expansion of the common law privacy torts to 
cover electronic intrusion and monitoring can be found in policies derived 
from two bodies of law more finely attuned to intellectual privacy con-
cerns: constitutional privacy law and copyright law. Compared with com-
mon law privacy rights, constitutional privacy rights manifest far greater 
concern with intellectual privacy. The drafters of the Constitution were 
concerned with safeguards against government overreaching, and so con-
stitutional protections for intellectual privacy have no direct application to 
the practices of private information providers. These protections are in-
structive nonetheless, for they reflect a set of values that our legal culture 
has identified as important and worth preserving. In particular, fourth and 
first amendment law supply principles designed to protect the spatial and 
informational attributes of intellectual privacy. Copyright law, meanwhile, 
implicitly presumes a degree of "breathing space," and of anonymity, for 
users of intellectual goods. In different ways, then, each body of law inter-
sects with and operationalizes aspects of the normative framework devel-
oped in Part II. 
a) DRM Technologies and Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
Application of the intrusion tort to DRM technologies finds parallels in 
a rapidly growing body of law that addresses the fourth amendment status 
of various types of remote information gathering. The federal courts have 
concluded that at least sometimes, disembodied intrusions by remote data 
sensors invade privacy rights protected by the fourth amendment. Most 
recently, in Kyllo v. United States,39 the Court held that extraction of heat 
signature information emanating from the defendant's home constituted a 
search, and required a warrant. In particular, the majority focused on the 
fact that the extraction technology was "not in general public use" and the 
fact that it enabled access to "details of the home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion.,,4o Kyllo does not ad-
dress whether reporting back to a machine should count, yet on the 
medical prescriptions); see also Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 859 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that employees stated a claim for publication of private 
facts where employer transmitted their social security numbers to third parties). 
39. 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S'. 705 (1984) (hold-
ing that use of an electronic beeper to track goods taken into a private residence consti-
tuted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). But see Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that use of pen register to record telephone numbers dialed 
from a private home was not an unreasonable search). 
40. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
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Court's reasoning there seems no reason why it should not. The search 
consists of the act of extraction, not what mayor may not follow it. 
Important questions remain about the scope of fourth amendment pro-
tection against virtual intrusion. First, it remains unclear whether the 
strong privacy protection specified by the Kyllo Court is to be limited spe-
cifically to the home.41 The majority's brand of originalism supports this 
intewretation,42 but other approaches to constitutional interpretation might 
not.4 In delineating the legally cognizable scope of intellectual privacy 
interests, this is a particularly important question. Homes are but one kind 
of private space, and perhaps not even the most significant where intellec-
tual activity is concemed.44 Arguably, one's desktop or laptop computer, 
personal data assistant, or portable media player sits at the center of the 
zone of intellectual privacy to which one is entitled, regardless of where in 
physical space it happens to be located.45 
Second, the "general public use" and "previously unknowable" inquir-
ies frame a difficult problem that pervades both constitutional and com-
mon law privacy jurisprudence. In the common law context, these inquir-
ies translate into the requirement that the intrusion be "offensive to the 
reasonable person.''''6 Like the "reasonable expectation of privacy" stan-
dard on which they build, all of these standards render privacy a moving 
target. Eventually, the courts will need to confront the fact that the ulti-
mate consequence of such an approach may be no privacy at all. 
In resolving both of these questions, it is important to note-both for 
fourth amendment purposes and for insight into the lessons that the com-
mon law of privacy should draw from its constitutional cousin-that the 
text of the fourth amendment places intellectual privacy front and center. 
41. See Andrew Riggs Dunlap, Note, Fixing the Fourth Amendment with Trade Se-
cret Law: A Response to Kyllo v. United States, 90 GEO. L.J. 2175, 2190 (2002). 
42. The Court grounded its holding in "that degree of privacy that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
43. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 17; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 
TEX. L. REv. 1165 (1993); Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and 
Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 
1093, 1114 (1996); Dunlap, supra note 41. 
44. See Dunlap, supra note 41, at 2187 ("Modem America is defined by the mobil-
ity of its people and their information."). 
45. Perhaps for this reason, government agents appear to believe that a warrant is 
required for searches of these items. See United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223,236 (5th 
Cir. 2002); United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 31,39 (D. Conn. 
2002). But cf Aronson v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 767 A.2d 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(holding that telecommunications company did not intrude upon customers' seclusion by 
allowing third parties to access their account information). 
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at § 117 
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The amendment extends protection against warrantless search and seizure 
not simply to the home, but also to individuals' "papers and effects.,,47 If 
individuals have no recourse against warrantless remote extraction of in-
formation from digital analogues to these items, wherever in physical 
space they may be located and however "ordinary" the technology used, 
then this protection stands to lose much of its meaning.48 So too, on the 
common law side, if widespread efforts to enshrine a new technology as a 
commercial standard can displace privacy rights.49 In the particular con-
text ofDRM, the deeply personal and private nature of intellectual activity 
provides relatively firm grounding for the conclusion that expecting ade-
quate protection for intellectual privacy is reasonable regardless of the 
number of ways in which technologies for delivery of intellectual goods 
can be designed to diminish privacy. 
The Fourth Amendment's greater sensitivity to the intersections be-
tween spatial privacy and intellectual privacy is an important guidepost for 
courts in common law intrusion cases to follow, if they choose. Even 
fourth amendment jurisprudence, however, provides relatively little assis-
tance in assessing whether direct constraints, without any reporting back, 
invade a legally protectable privacy interest. By its own terms, the fourth 
amendment cannot even reach this question. Whether or not they are con-
sidered to invade privacy, such constraints cannot constitute a "search." 
The argument that effective privacy protection should include control 
over the spaces of intellectual consumption finds support, instead, within 
both the substantive provisions and the overall structure of copyright law. 
The fair use doctrine, which sanctions certain acts of private copying, 
shields a range of actions that users might take in private spaces, including 
time- and space-shifting of copies, loading and reloading of digital files, 
and manipulation of digital content. 50 The first sale doctrine, which estab-
lishes the right to dispose of one's copy of a work without any obligation 
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Dunlap, supra note 41, at 2190-93. 
48. See Adler, supra note 43; Dunlap, supra note 41, at 2190 ("Theoretically, then, 
if one could pick up a thermal imager at Wal-Mart for a reasonable cost, it would not 
create concern under [Kyllo)."). 
49. For more detailed discussion of this point, see Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, 
and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2033 (2001). 
50. 17 U.S.c. § 107 (2000); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984); MatteI, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 321-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); cf 
Recording Indus. Ass'n (RIAA) v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that digital music player designed to allow space-shifting, but not 
further copying, of digital music files was not covered by the Audio Home Recording 
Act's royalty and copy-protection requirements, and that this result was consistent with 
the AHRA's exemption for personal noncommercial copying). 
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to seek the copyright owner's approval,51 similarly rests on the belief that 
a copyright owner has no cognizable interest in a broad range of post-
purchase user activities or in the spaces where they occur. More broadly, 
because copyright law does not give copyright owners the exclusive right 
to control all uses of their copyrighted works, it implicitly reserves to us-
ers the right to engage in conduct not encompassed by the statute.52 Copy-
right does not, for example, encompass such acts as reading a copy of a 
book, viewing a copy of a movie, or listening to a copy of a musical re-
cording that one owns; not coincidentally, these are all acts that ordinarily 
occur within private spaces. 
It may be argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's 
(DMCA) protections for DRM technologies threaten to change rather sub-
stantially, and as a matter of federal law, the degree of informational and 
spatial privacy to which users of intellectual goods are entitled. In fact, the 
language of the DMCA supports the opposite conclusion: Congress did 
not intend the DMCA to negate the intellectual privacy of information 
consumers. An exception to the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision 
authorizes users of copyrighted works to circumvent technical measures 
capable of collecting or disseminating information about their "online ac-
tivities" if those measures are undisclosed and do not provide an opt-out 
mechanism. 53 Under this provision, users appear free to subvert certain 
types of DRM monitoring. In addition, a special savings provision of the 
statute expressly preserves federal and state laws protecting individual 
privacy "in connection with the individual's use of the Intemet.,,54 The 
51. 17 U.S.c. § 109(a). 
52. In this respect, the fair use doctrine is poorly named. The term "fair use" tends 
to suggest that if some uses of copyrighted works are fair, then all other uses must be 
unfair. Fair use and other copyright limitations are not outer limits on permissible uses of 
copyrighted works and/or the things embodying them. They are simply outer limits on a 
copyright owner's statutory rights. Uses not covered by any of those rights, such as read-
ing a copy of a book that one owns, are reserved to users whether or not the fair use doc-
trine would apply to them. 
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i). Paul Schwartz has argued that these provisions should 
be understood, in part, as an attempt to stimulate the adoption of notice and opt-out 
norms for the online marketplace. See Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 
32 CONN. L. REv. 815, 848-50 (2000). 
54. 17 U.S.C. § 1205 ("Nothing in this chapter abrogates, diminishes, or weakens 
the provisions of, nor provides any defense or element of mitigation in a criminal prose-
cution or civil action under, any Federal or State law that prevents the violation of the 
privacy of an individual in connection with the individual's use of the Internet."). This 
provision is probably best interpreted as preserving information providers' obligations 
under the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act and analogous state laws; thus, 
for example, a software company caught monitoring customers' use of its e-mail program 
could not claim that the DMCA allows it to do so. 
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DMCA says nothing about its interaction with other federal or state pri-
vacy laws, just as it says nothing about its interaction with many other 
background rules of law, but that does not mean it negates them. (The 
DMCA says nothing about its interaction with the background law of con-
tract, either.) That users are not authorized to circumvent a broader range 
of privacy-invasive measures does not mean that information providers 
have carte blanche to employ them. The most plausible explanation for the 
specific provisions relating to online activities is simply that interest 
groups brought these problems to the drafting committees' attention. The 
legislative history does not suggest that any of the relevant committees 
ever undertook a more thorough exploration of the privacy question. 
In short, copyright law traditionally has honored a version of the pub-
lic-private distinction that is extremely robust,55 and the DMCA does not 
purport to reject that tradition. Whether a provider of digital information is 
honoring or abusing this distinction should inform application of the 
common law intrusion tort, even to (at least some) DRM technologies that 
simply impose direct constraints on user behavior. From a copyright per-
spective the difference between reporting back and simple constraint is 
less relevant than the difference between public exploitation and private 
consumption. When deciding whether particular DRM constraints rise to 
the level of an actionable intrusion, courts should take this perspective into 
account. 
b) DRM Technologies, "Likenesses," and "Private Facts" 
Application of the appropriation and "private facts" torts to DRM 
monitoring technologies finds parallels in first amendment jurisprudence 
touching on intellectual privacy. First amendment cases involving the 
compelled disclosure of reading and viewing habits find intellectual activ-
ity quintessentially private because of the chilling effect on private expres-
sive and political activity that might result from compelled disclosure of 
opinions and associations. 56 The chill may diminish when private compul-
55. For other perspectives on the public-private distinction within copyright law, 
see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 28-30, 216-24(1994), acknowledging the distinction but arguing that copyright 
should extend its reach into private spaces, and JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
194-95 (2001), arguing that copyright rules should conform more nearly to user expecta-
tions. 
56. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 751-
66 (1996); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1969); Schneider v. Smith, 390 
U.S. 17,24-25 (1968); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965); Fabulous 
Assoc., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. UtiI. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 785 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Gibson 
v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963); Bates v. City of Little 
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sion replaces state compulsion, but it does not disappear. In the age of dis-
tributed databases, the pertinent fact is that a record of the activity exists, 
and may be acquired and used by either state or private parties. 57 
On similar reasoning, both the private facts and appropriation torts 
should encompass the sale, rental, or trading of information about patterns 
of intellectual consumption. Arguably, the harms resulting from disclosure 
of private facts relating to intellectual activities and preferences are at least 
as great as those resulting from disclosure of information about sexual ac-
tivities and preferences, since it is the former rather than the latter upon 
which a democratic society relies to constitute its citizens. And if a profile 
of intellectual activities and preferences can chill expressive and associa-
tive conduct, it is hard to see why it should not be deemed a "likeness"-
whether flattering or unflattering is beside the point-of the individual to 
whom it refers. Nor is it relevant that this sort of consumer profiling activ-
ity typically does not involve general publication of the offending infor-
mation. Both torts also have been recognized in cases involving more lim-
ited publication. 58 For the private facts tort, the touchstone is the disclo-
sure and the injury it causes; for the appropriation tort, it is the unauthor-
ized commercial use. In neither case does the injury depend on general 
publication, but rather on the nature of the information and the identities 
of the recipients.59 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516,523-24 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 
460-62 (1958). See generally Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 2, at 
1008-15 (analyzing the cases and arguing that arguing that they implicitly recognize a 
right of anonymity for readers, viewers, and listeners). 
57. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc., 26 Med. L. 
Rptr. 1599, 1600 (D.D.C. 1998); Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 
1047 (Colo. 2002). 
58. Among the recent information privacy cases discussing this point are Bodah v. 
Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), and Weld v. CVS 
Pharmacy, Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-0897F, 1999 WL 494114 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 28, 
1999). 
59. Notwithstanding that first amendment values support extension of the appropria-
tion and private facts torts to protect intellectual privacy, first amendment principles also 
limit the reach of both torts. Although the exact location of the first amendment boundary 
is a matter of some dispute, see, for example, Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 2; 
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1125 (2000); 
Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh's First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1559 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From 
Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049 (2000), it is not my intent to question its 
existence. It is worth noting, however, that precisely because of first amendment limita-
tions on the scope of information privacy protection, one might legitimately conclude that 
limited disclosures of information about intellectual activities and preferences between 
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Further support for expansion of the appropriation tort to encompass 
transactional identity comes, paradoxically, from privacy's commercial 
doppelganger, the common law right of publicity. Like the privacy tort of 
unauthorized appropriation, rights of publicity protect against unauthor-
ized appropriation of names and likenesses. Rights of publicity typically 
are invoked to protect commercially valuable likenesses, while rights of 
privacy are not, but both theories seek to reserve control over commercial 
exploitation of identity to the individual with whom that identity is associ-
ated. Unlike courts hearing privacy cases, courts in publicity cases have 
generously construed the concept of "likeness," extending protection to 
any attribute of jersonality that can reasonably be identified as belonging 
to the plaintiff.6 Courts and commentators justify this expansion with ref-
erence to both the increasing value of (celebrity) identity and the many 
forms that identity can assume in the age of mass culture and advertis-
ing.61 If it is true that manifestations of identity have become increasingly 
protean in the information age, there seems to be no good reason why the 
common law of privacy should not also recognize protectable attributes of 
identity in commercial profiles. Indeed, the case for such protection is far 
stronger than in the publicity context; actual data about one's own transac-
parties intent on exploiting that information for commercial or prosecutorial benefit are 
more troubling than generaVjournalistic publication of the information. 
60. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(imitation of singer's distinctive voice and singing style); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 
971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (game show hostess's gown and game show setting),peti-
tionfor reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 
951 (1993); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (imitation of 
singer's distinctive voice and singing style); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 
Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836-37 (6th Cir. 1983) (talk show host's "trademark" slogan); 
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821,827 (9th Cir. 1974) (race 
car driver's distinctively decorated car). 
61. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, The Right of Publicity in Digitally Produced Images: How the First 
Amendment Is Being Used to Pick Celebrities' Pockets, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 1 (2002); 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L.J. 1 (1997); see also Jennifer L. Carpenter, 
Internet Publication: The Case for an Expanded Right of Publicity for Non-Celebrities, 6 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2001) (arguing that private individuals also should enjoy rights of 
publicity in certain circumstances). Many commentators, however, argue that the un-
checked expansion of publicity rights threatens other important public values, including 
freedom of expression and cultural diversity, and that the arguments advanced to support 
this expansion do not adequately answer these concerns. See, e.g., Michael Madow, Pri-
vate Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 
125 (1993); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Prop-
erty and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 J. ART & ENT. L. 
& POL'y 283 (2000). 
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tional history and preferences are far more directly bound up with identity 
than mere allusions intended to trigger some mental association in others. 
Finally, the same copyright rules that create a presumption of spatial 
privacy also provide strong implicit support for informational privacy 
claims directed toward exploitation of the information gained from DRM 
monitoring. In particular, the fair use doctrine supports a strong presump-
tion of anonymity around privileged uses. The functions and benefits of 
anonymity are clearest in the case of fair use. Fair use privileges a variety 
of activities that are deemed socially valuable, but to which private copy-
right holders might object.62 Anonymity permits these activities to go for-
ward, and allows fair users to decide later whether to reveal their identities 
when releasing their work. In other cases, the costs and delay involved in 
seeking permission might strike the would-be fair user as prohibitive, even 
if the overall social value resulting from the use would outweigh these 
costS.63 Having to seek permission from the copyright holder ex ante 
would chill both types of uses; anonymity for fair users mitigates the twin 
problems of private censorship and high transaction costs, and allows so-
ciety to receive the benefit of many controversial and/or spontaneous uses 
that otherwise would not occur. 64 
* * * 
Synthesis of the intrusion, appropriation, and private facts torts with 
these insights derived from conceptually related areas of law would yield 
more expansive conceptions of actionable intrusion, appropriable identity, 
and sensitive personal information. This result is broadly consistent with 
62. Examples of such activities include criticism, for example, New Era Pub/'ns 
Inn v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990), parody, for example, Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), and Sun trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (l1th Cir. 2001), and the reverse engineering of computer software to 
achieve interoperability, for example, Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 
203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000), and Sega Enter., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
63. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of 
"Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1998); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the 
Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 l 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997); cf Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intel-
lectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989 (1997). Examples of such activities include 
technical innovation in the design of search engines, for example, Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2002), the design of consumer electronic equipment 
that facilitates both infringing and non-infringing uses of copyrighted content, for exam-
ple, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and reverse engi-
neering again. 
64. See Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Manage-
ment Systems, 15 HARV. lL. & TECH. 41, 60 (2001). 
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the normative model of privacy developed in Part II, which focuses on 
control of access to self and insulation for constitutive activities. It is also 
broadly consistent with the core policies underlying each tort: to preserve, 
respectively, individual control of space, identity, and "face." 
Why, though, should the common law of privacy make these leaps? 
For all the ingrained conservatism of the common law method, recogniz-
ing and responding to changing circumstances by redefining legally cog-
nizable injury and responsibility are central functions of the courts. Many 
legal rules that we take for granted today simply did not exist forty or fifty 
years ago. One example is the law of strict products liability, under which 
an injured consumer may recover damages directly from the manufacturer 
of a defective product even if there is no privity of contract.65 Another is 
the law of sexual harassment, which recognizes that sex-based hazing in 
the workplace can amount to discrimination in violation of federallaw.66 
In each context, the courts gradually came to recognize that new forms of 
injury resulting from changed marketplace realities warranted new modes 
of redress. 
In a similar fashion, courts can and should respond to new forms of in-
jury enabled by the rise of digital network communications and the atten-
dant transformations of commerce in information. In copyright circles, this 
point is hardly novel, but lawmakers and courts have focused their atten-
tion largely on new sources of injury to information providers.67 As these 
historical examples suggest, it is appropriate to focus, as well, on new 
sources of injury to information users, and doing so will not bring com-
merce in information screeching to a halt. The project of transforming ex-
isting doctrine to accommodate the unprecedented is itself firmly rooted in 
precedent. 
There is, however, one major obstacle to the development of robust 
common law standards of intellectual privacy. Traditionally, common law 
privacy protections may be waived. As long as the contract is otherwise 
enforceable, one may consent to audio- or videotaping of the activities in-
side one's home, or to commercial exploitation of one's name or likeness, 
65. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,461 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring); Sheward v. Virtue, 126 P.2d 345 (Cal. 1942); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1961); Carter v. Yardley & 
Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 695-96 (Mass. 1946); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 
488 (Minn. 1967); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., III N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); Ritter v. 
Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255,261 (R.I. 1971). 
66. See Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Bundy v. Jackson, 
641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Tomkins v. Pub. Servo Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 
(3d Cir. 1977); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
67. See LITMAN, supra note 55. 
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or to publication of sensitive information about one's sexual habits. Be-
cause the privacy invasions effected by DRM technologies occur in the 
context of consensual commercial transactions, the mechanisms for estab-
lishing effective consent can easily be put in place. 
Neither copyright law nor constitutional privacy law offers a clear way 
out here. Constitutional protections also can be waived. Copyright law, 
meanwhile, is silent about when parties may contract around the rights and 
limitations that it specifies. This silence has engendered an extensive 
scholarly debate about whether such contracts should be prohibited, under 
either a theory of preemption or one of misuse, as violating fundamental 
public policy.68 Detailed consideration of those debates is outside the 
scope of this Article; for our purposes, the important point is that neither 
preemption nor misuse is well-suited to address the privacy problems 
stemming from DRM technologies. The fundamental public policy that 
both doctrines seek to preserve is the "copyright balance" between incen-
tives and access. User privacy serves related purposes, and a decision 
striking down a particular contract provision might have the effect of pro-
moting privacy, but privacy is not central to the incentives/access inquiry. 
For a specifically privacy-regarding theory of contract's limits, we must 
look elsewhere. 
2. Consumer Protection Law and the Fair Information Practices 
Although consumer protection law has not traditionally been viewed 
as a significant component of information policy in the U.S., that is chang-
ing. In an era in which mass-distributed information goods are increas-
ingly bundled with lengthy, complex licenses, the connections between 
consumer protection and information policy can no longer be ignored. Al-
though the issue of privacy in intellectual consumption has not yet re-
ceived specific attention, both the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
intellectual property scholars have begun to focus more closely on these 
connections.69 Where privacy is concerned, judge-made law and consumer 
68. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellec-
tual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. III (1999); David Nimmer et ai., The Meta-
morphosis of Contract Into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REv. 17 (1999); J.H. Reichman & Jona-
than A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom 
of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 875 (1999); David 
A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Soft-
ware License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 543 (1992). 
69. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW AND POLICY IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ 
intellectlindex.htm (last modified Oct. 28, 2002) (listing press releases and hearing no-
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protection regulation have complementary roles to play. While properly 
reformulated common law privacy torts can police the worst excesses of 
DRM, consumer protection law operating prospectively can set minimum 
standards of protection that all information providers must follow. 
One advantage of a consumer protection approach to the terms of in-
formation access and use is that it allows policymakers to consider con-
sumer welfare directly, rather than waiting for courts to parse out the im-
plications of a statutory scheme (such as copyright) designed primarily to 
accomplish some other purpose. Whether this change in emphasis might 
translate into significant substantive protection for consumers depends on 
the prevailing standard for consumer well-being. U.S. consumer protection 
law is not particularly well tailored to safeguard the intellectual privacy of 
information users. Like the common law privacy torts, however, it has the 
potential to be. 
Consumer protection law in the U.S. has focused primarily, though not 
exclusively, on maximizing market-based indicia of consumer welfare. 
The FTC has jurisdiction to regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce.,,70 In implementing this mandate, it has largely 
confined itself to policing deception, and has been reluctant to provide 
other sorts of protection to consumers who are adequately and accurately 
informed. Whatever the merits of this approach in other contexts, as an 
approach to privacy protection it is demonstrably inadequate. An extensive 
literature supports the conclusion that the idea of a well-functioning "mar-
ket for privacy" is irremediably flawed.7l In many transactions, retaining 
control of one's personal information simply is not an option. Even when 
it is, pervasive and likely incurable information problems prevent indi-
viduals from evaluating the relevant tradeoffs.72 More fundamentally, pri-
vacy tradeoffs involve incommensurable values, and the dignitary values 
tices from February through November 2002); U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, W AR-
RANTY PROTECTION FOR HIGH-TECH PRODUCTS AND SERVICES, at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bcp/workshops/warranty/index.html (Oct. 26-27, 2000) (transcripts of hearings). 
70. 15 U.S.c. § 45(a)(I) (2000). 
71. See, e.g., GANDY, supra note 27; Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 2; A. Mi-
chael Froornkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digi-
tal Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395,492 (1996); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 V AND. L. REv. 1607 (1999) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy]; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of 
Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1, 47-51 (1997) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Personal Health Care Information]; Sovem, supra note 27. 
72. See Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 2, at 1397-99; Froornkin, supra note 71, 
at 492; Schwartz, Personal Health Care Information, supra note 71, at 47-51; Sovem, 
supra note 27, at 1052-94. 
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at stake in decisions about privacy arguably are not an appropriate subject 
for market ordering.73 For the reasons discussed in Part ILA, this argument 
is particularly strong where intellectual privacy is concerned. Under the 
Clinton Administration, the FTC called without success for federallegisla-
tion establishing stronger protection for online privacy.74 If the FTC 
wishes to play a more effective role in safeguarding the intellectual pri-
vacy of information consumers, however, it can begin by rethinking its 
interpretation of its statutory mandate. 
A somewhat more robust vision of information privacy protection is 
embodied in guidelines issued in 1980 by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, which outlined a set of Fair Information 
Practices (FIPs) based on eight principles: collection limitation, data qual-
ity, purpose specification, use limitation, transparency of information col-
lection practices, security of stored data, individual participation, and ac-
countability.75 Although the U.S. played an important role in developing 
these principles, the FIPs have never been fully incorporated into U.S. 
law. In part, this is the result of sustained resistance by the information 
and direct marketing industries. In part, it is because the proceduralist un-
derstanding of consumer protection already enshrined within FTC practice 
pairs more comfortably with a version of fair information practices based 
simply on notice and consent. 76 More faithful adherence to the FIPs would 
enhance the information privacy of users of copyrighted works and other 
information goods.77 The FTC has taken some steps in that direction, but 
only partial steps and only pursuant to additional, narrowly defined statu-
73. See Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 2; Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, 
supra note 71. For this reason, it may make sense to conclude that the law should protect 
(some aspects of) privacy even for individuals who would cheerfully trade it away. See 
Allen, supra note 2; Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 2. 
74. See U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION 
PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000). 
75. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA, in OECD 
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL 
DATA 14-16 (Sept. 23, 1980), available at http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/ 
9302011E.PDF (last visited May 4,2003) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES]. 
76. For discussion of this point, see Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Pri-
vacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 773-81 (1999). 
77. It also would enhance the functioning of markets in personal information by 
ensuring that personal information is accurate and that data processing operations more 
completely internalize their costs. 
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tory mandates.78 Extending the full protection of the FIPs to all consumers 
is appropriate in an age in which personal profiling increasingly tracks not 
only purchases of durable goods but also private intellectual activities. 
Even with more rigorous application of the FIPs, however, the prob-
lem of privacy in intellectual consumption is too complex to be resolved 
by data processing standards alone, for several reasons. First, the FIPs do 
not address spatial privacy, and so have nothing to say about the sorts of 
behavioral restrictions effected by DRM technologies.79 Thus, even scru-
pulous adherence to the FIPs would not address all of the privacy concerns 
discussed in Part II. Second, even with respect to information privacy, the 
FIPs do not establish minimum substantive thresholds for privacy protec-
tion. At most, they are designed to facilitate informed contracting and 
meaningful quality control by individuals who are the subjects of data 
transactions. Finally and relatedly, the FIPs do not address important 
threshold questions of contract validity. That is, they say nothing about 
whether some privacy rights should be protected even against knowing 
waivers by informed consumers. 
For consumer protection law to provide meaningful protection for in-
tellectual privacy (or any other kind of privacy), the proceduralist stan-
dards embodied in the FIPs must be augmented by substantive privacy 
standards. Here the act of legal imagination consists in realizing that al-
though the FTC has not traditionally involved itself in setting substantive 
standards of consumer protection, its mandate to address "unfair" trade 
78. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 16 C.F.R. § 313 (2003); Chil-
dren's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2003) (establishing rules govern-
ing online collection of personal information from children under 13); see also U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMM., SAFE HARBOR OVERVIEW, in SAFE HARBOR, at http://www.export. 
gov/safeharborlsh_overview.html (last visited May 4, 2003) (establishing guidelines for 
U.S. companies that process personally identifying information relating to European Un-
ion citizens, and vesting enforcement authority with the FTC for most industries). To be 
fair, the FTC has been hampered to a degree by a sectoral approach to privacy regulation 
at the jurisdictional level. Jurisdiction to regulate in the area of medical privacy is vested 
in the Department of Health and Human Services, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (2000), and juris-
diction to regulate in the area of telecommunications privacy is vested in the Federal 
Communications Commission, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) (2000). Nonetheless, the FTC retains 
general authority to regulate unfair and deceptive practices over a wide range of goods 
and services. 
79. Proposed legislation specifically authorizing the FTC to require accurate label-
ing of DRM technologies that directly constrain consumer behavior would address this 
omission, but again by providing only procedural protection to consumers. See Digital 
Consumer Right to Know Act, S. 692, 108th Congo (2003); Digital Media Consumers' 
Rights Act of2003, H.R. 107, 108th Congo (2003). 
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practices is broad enough to encompass such a move.SO Put differently, a 
market-making conception of fairness is not the only possible definition of 
that term, nor is it the only sensible one. Where consumers cannot play on 
an equal footing with other market participants, it serves neither fairness 
nor markets to pretend they can.8! 
In the context of information privacy, one example of a substantive 
standard of fairness is the European Union's data processing directive, 
which delineates certain kinds of information as sensitive and allows 
member states to place them off limits.82 Similarly, if intellectual profiling 
is deemed to create unacceptable risk of harm to consumers, one might 
envision a regulation settin~ limits on the collection, use, retention, and 
trading of such information. 3 In the context of spatial privacy, an example 
of substantive privacy protection might be a regulation prohibiting certain 
kinds of electronic self-help,84 or preserving a limited degree of freedom 
to space-shift digital files. By establishing and enforcing these sorts of 
standards, consumer protection authorities can help to ensure that indi-
80. The Federal Trade Commission's enabling statute defines an "unfair or decep-
tive act or practice" as one that "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consum-
ers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2000). This 
definition is "not limited to those [practices] likely to have anticompetitive consequences 
after the manner of the antitrust laws; nor [a ]re unfair practices in commerce confined to 
purely competitive behavior." FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 
(1972). Instead, it gives the FTC authority to consider a broader range of "public values." 
!d.; see also Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 292-94 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming FTC 
order requiring mail-order retailer to cease and desist from suing delinquent customers in 
its own home state, on the ground that invocation of the state's long-arm statute under 
those circumstances violated public policy). 
81. Steven Hetcher has argued that the FTC's current stance toward online privacy, 
which emphasizes self-regulation via the adoption of privacy policies, constitutes an in-
novative attempt to extend jurisdiction over information privacy issues. Steven Hetcher, 
The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2041, 2046, 2056 
(2000). According to Hetcher, the FTC's policy of "norm entrepreneurship" constitutes a 
logical response to the privacy problem given both the complexity of the problem and the 
difficulty of generating political consensus around the regulation of online conduct. !d. at 
2052, 2055-58. I do not disagree with this assessment. My disagreement with the prevail-
ing regulatory approach to privacy runs deeper, and is directed at the regulatory mindset 
that assumes that, when regulatory supervision is feasible, the optimal model is one that 
places primary reliance on markets. 
82. See Council 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data). 
83. Such a regulation might be modeled on the Video Privacy Protection Act of 
1988,18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000), or on state library privacy statutes. See supra note 4. 
84. Such a regulation would also have the beneficial effect of resolving the ongoing 
debate among the drafters ofUCITA. See supra note 29. 
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viduals retain meaningful control over both the sRatial and informational 
dimensions of their own intellectual consumption. 5 
B. Contractual Waiver and Intellectual Privacy as Fundamental 
Public Policy 
The single greatest obstacle to effective legal protection of privacy in 
intellectual consumption is not imperfect fit with the available legal theo-
ries, but the fact that each available theory gives way to contract in many, 
if not all, circumstances. Many believe that this deference to contract is 
entirely appropriate. They observe that, from the information provider's 
perspective, the greater power to withhold the transaction entirely logi-
cally includes the lesser power to impose conditions on the terms of access 
and use. From the individual user's perspective, these conditions may di-
minish privacy, but users remain free to accept or reject the terms offered 
to them. Indeed, advocates for market ordering of privacy rights argue that 
the right to contract away privacy interests is itself a good that consumers 
may desire. Privacy advocates have persuasively argued that the argument 
from contract is far too simplistic, and ignores both marketplace realities 
and important non-market considerations. Thus far, however, the law has 
failed to translate these challenges into a workable legal theory capable of 
displacing contract when threats to privacy reach unacceptable levels. 
Some challenges to contractual ordering of privacy rights focus on im-
perfections that are likely to prevent market mechanisms from working 
smoothly. These challenges fall into two general categories. First are pro-
cedural challenges to the validity of waiver via online adhesion contracts. 
In the age of "clickwrap," however, defects relating to consent are easily 
cured by requiring the consumer to pass through a screen displaying li-
cense terms and to indicate assent to those terms after having had the op-
portunity to review them.86 A second set of challenges based on market 
85. In addition, as I will discuss in Part IV, the law has an important role to play in 
ensuring that substantive protections for privacy are incorporated into the design of DRM 
technologies at the outset. 
86. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Caspi v. Mi-
crosoft Network LLC, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); see also Specht v. 
Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 306 F.3d 
17 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding clickwrap terms unenforceable where transaction protocol did 
not include a review-and-assent procedure, but instead displayed license terms only to 
those users who scrolled past the download button and followed a link to terms posted 
elsewhere on the vendor's web site); Ticketrnaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 54 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1344 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (same). This is also the solution adopted by the draft-
ers ofUCITA. See UCITA § 209 (1999). This is not to make light of what commentators 
rightly identify as a paradigm shift in prevailing understandings of the sort of consent 
required to create a binding contract. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Com-
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imperfections focuses on issues of market power. If a dominant vendor has 
market power, it becomes harder to posit a meaningful level of competi-
tion to satisfy the full range of consumer preferences. But the conventional 
form of this inquiry looks only to the power of individual market partici-
pants, and not to the market power that results from widespread adoption 
of standard form terms.87 As a result, this argument has weight only in 
monopoly markets, and therefore very little weight in most markets for 
online information goods. 
Both types of argument from market imperfection, however, fit com-
fortably within a larger conceptual framework that presumes the rightness 
of market ordering if only some defect could be brought under control. 
Neither challenges the baseline presumption in favor of contractual order-
ing in properly functioning markets. As a result, each rapidly becomes 
mired in the details of this or that clickwrap procedure or market practice. 
The more fundamental question-whether market ordering of privacy 
rights makes sense at all-remains obscured. It is not terribly surprising, 
then, that these sorts of arguments have failed to generate the impetus for 
meaningful reform of the legal rules governing waiver of privacy rights. 
Other challenges to contractual ordering of privacy rights step outside 
the market framework, and argue that even in perfectly functioning mar-
kets, contract would be ineffective to preserve privacy, or to do so fairly.88 
As discussed in Part IILA.2, some of these arguments rest on the premise 
that in the modem mass marketplace, consumer choice about privacy is 
illusory; others point to the insoluble information problems that consumers 
confront in assessing privacy tradeoffs; and still others reject a priori the 
puters, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.l. 1125 (2000). But that paradigm shift re-
sulted from the rise of consumer mass markets decades ago. Technologies for indicating 
"consent" online simply underscore what we already know to be true: that in mass mar-
kets, the idea of a "meeting of minds" is little more than a pleasant fiction. 
87. See Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 
1.L. & ECON. 461,468 n.15, 484-91 (1974); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Todd D. 
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173 
(1984); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
Making Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529, 538-42 (1971); William T. Vukowich, Lawyers 
and the Standard Form Contract System: A Model Rule That Should Have Been, 6 GEO. 
1. LEGAL ETHICS 799, 800-11 (1993); see also Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property 
and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1570, 1611-
13 (1995) (examining standard form terms within the narrower context of antitrust-style 
market power). 
88. See, e.g., Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 2; Schwartz, Privacy and Democ-
racy, supra note 71. 
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notion that market resolution of privacy policy is appropriate.89 On any of 
these views, the problem is not market failure, but rather a more systemic 
incompetence of markets. 
It is a measure of the degree to which both academic and policy de-
bates have been captured by the rhetoric of markets and private ordering 
that arguments in this last group receive comparatively little attention. In 
the current climate, arguments from human dignity seem both insuffi-
ciently rigorous and vaguely passe. Yet the reluctance to address privacy 
in non-market terms is puzzling, for two reasons. As Jessica Litman has 
pointed out (and as privacy advocates "in the trenches" have always 
known), that is the way that ordinary people think about privacy.9o Ordi-
nary people-not academics, technologists, science fiction writers, or 
other members of the cyber-literati-react to abuses of privacy with out-
rage and a sense of betrayal, and feel that commercial dealings should be 
accompanied by privacy obligations.91 That this outrage rarely translates 
into meaningful market resistance should not surprise us; if markets for 
privacy are inherently dysfunctional, there is no reason to expect this re-
sult.92 
If one looks, instead, at other public policy-based limits on contract, 
the proposition that public policy should limit contractual waiver of pri-
vacy rights becomes much less remarkable than the rhetoric of current pri-
vacy debates makes it seem. Most people agree that there are some public 
policies that should not be altered by contract. Perhaps the best example is 
the general policy that one may not contract into a state of slavery, but 
there are many other, less dramatic examples. One is the rule that one may 
not sell one's organs for transplant, research, or any other use.93 Two addi-
89. See supra Part III.A.2. 
90. Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1283, 1305-09 (2000). 
91. See id.; LAURA J. GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE: THE 
ONLINE PROTESTS OVER LOTUS MARKETPLACE AND THE CLIPPER CHIP (1997). 
92. The lack of market resistance by consumers is routinely invoked by privacy op-
ponents as purportedly demonstrating a lack of genuine public concern with privacy. See, 
e.g., Solveig Singleton, Electronic Commerce: The Current Status of Privacy Protections 
for Online Consumers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade and Con-
sumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Congo (July 13,1999), avail-
able at http://www.cato.orgitestimony/ct-ss071399.html; Privacilla.org, Comparing Pri-
vacy Polls and Consumer Behavior, at http://www.privacilla.org/fundamentals/pollsand 
behavior.htm1 (last visited Mar. 21, 2003) (pointing out that "[ r leal preferences are re-
vealed by consumer's actions ... "). 
93. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000); Newman V. Sathyavag1swaran, 287 F.3d 786, 
794 (9th Cir. 2002); Perry V. Saint Francis Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 
1565 (D. Kan. 1995); Wilson V. Adkins, 941 S.W.2d 440 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997). This pro-
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tional examples are the rules that providers of health care and of mass-
marketed products, respectively, may not contract out of medical malprac-
tice liability or liability for a defective product even if the patient or cus-
tomer asserts willingness to risk injury in return for a lower price.94 Still 
another, more recent example is set forth in a New York trial court's rul-
ing enjoining a software developer from forbidding licensees to publish 
critical reviews of its products.9 In each of these situations, the question 
whether the "free market" might equilibrate in a way that preserves the 
default rule is considered irrelevant. 
This brief list illustrates two salient points about the sorts of public 
policies that are considered "important" enough to trump contract. First, 
these policies bolster noneconomic values that run the gamut from bodily 
integrity to freedom of expression to human dignity and self-
determination. Privacy in general and intellectual privacy in particular fall 
comfortably within this spectrum. Second and equally important, the ap-
peal to public policy is not simply an appeal to logic or political theory, 
but also to visceral notions of fairness and human dignity. For privacy 
concerns to trump contract, privacy advocates must establish not only that 
privacy values are similar in kind to other public values that society has 
sought to preserve, but also that they are similarly compelling. Once con-
vinced of this, courts could quite easily develop rules limiting privacy 
waivers just as they have limited contractual waivers in other contexts. 
hibition is grounded in a public policy against reducing the human body to a marketable 
commodity. Also void, under a similar rationale, are contracts for sexual services and 
contracts for the sale of children to adoptive parents. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 
P.2d 106, 109 (Cal. 1976) (sexual services); Downs v. Wortman, 185 S.E.2d 387 (Ga. 
1971) (adoption); Willey v. Lawton, 132 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. Ct. App. 1956) (same); Baxter v. 
Wilburn, 190 A. 773 (Md. 1937) (same). 
94. See Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 730 (D. Haw. 1993) (holding 
that release agreement barring gross negligence claims against manufacturer and provider 
of paraglider was void as against public policy); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 
P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (holding that required agreement releasing hospital from malprac-
tice liability was void as against public policy); Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. App. 1993) (holding that "as is" and assumption of risk clauses in ski 
equipment rental agreement did not bar recovery for skiing injuries caused by defective 
ski); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.l 1960) (holding that 
agreement disclaiming implied warranty of merchantability was void as against public 
policy); Ash v. N.Y. Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that 
required agreement releasing hospital from malpractice liability was void as against pub-
lic policy). 
95. See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General, Judge Orders 
Software Developer to Remove and Stop Using Deceptive and Restrictive Clauses (Jan. 
17,2003), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/jan/janI7a_03.html. 
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At bottom, the argument for limiting waiver of intellectual privacy 
rights is straightforward, and builds upon the argument in Parts II and 
III.A, above, about why intellectual privacy is important and why the law 
should recognize harms to intellectual privacy in the first instance. Argu-
ments about markets and market failures aside, intangible invasions of in-
tellectual privacy are capable of causing great harm to individuals, and of 
substantially undermining shared, nonmonetizable values. Such invasions 
compromise rights of self-determination and undermine human dignity by 
eliminating the "breathing space" for intellectual development. A decision 
to promote these values in the law of "privacy" while simultaneously ena-
bling easy evasion of accountability via "contract" would be nothing short 
of perverse. Taking these intangible harms seriously requires a more con-
sistent approach. 
IV. BUILDING INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY INTO CODE 
Although legal sanctions for invasion of intellectual privacy are essen-
tial to guarantee respect for the intellectual privacy rights of information 
users, both judicial and regulatory sanctions are second-best strategies for 
ensuring effective protection for all users. A far more effective method of 
ensuring that information users actually enjoy the privacy to which they 
are entitled would entail building privacy into the design of DRM tech-
nologies in the first instance. In such a world, legal protection for intellec-
tual privacy would serve as backdrop to more proactive, privacy-regarding 
conduct by (most) providers of information goods. Taking privacy into 
account at the outset requires a different approach to designing DRM 
technologies, and also requires a process for ensuring that, once designed, 
more privacy-protective DRM technologies are actually put in place. 
A. Value-Sensitive Design for DRM 
The notion of value-sensitive design is an outgrowth of the interdisci-
plinary study of science, technology, and society. Careful attention to the 
social embeddedness of technologies reminds us that technologies them-
selves are social artifacts; they constitute and are constituted by social val-
ues and interests.96 This insight, in tum, suggests that careful attention to 
values and value choices at the design stage might produce important pay-
offs. In particular, as elaborated by Batya Friedman and her colleagues, 
one might envision an iterative research and design process that includes 
conceptual analysis of the values and value tradeoffs implicated by differ-
96. For helpful expositions of these themes, see BUKER, supra note 22; MACKENZIE, 
supra note 22; WINNER, supra note 22. 
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ent designs, technical investigation of the range of design possibilities, and 
empirical study of user experiences with and responses to different de-
signs.97 Efforts to identify and catalog relevant "values" must, of course, 
be conducted with an appropriate degree of humility. Making these efforts, 
however, seems infinitely preferable to the alternative. 
In context of DRM technologies, the value-sensitive design approach 
would consider design for maximum control as only one potential direc-
tion that a DRM infrastructure could take.98 Alternatively, one might 
imagine developing a design process devoted to exploring the full range of 
values, both private and public, implicated in DRM design, identifying the 
range of possible designs that might accommodate those values, and op-
erationalizing DRM in a way that preserves an acceptable balance among 
competing public goods and private and user interests. Of particular rele-
vance here, a value-sensitive design process for DRM technologies would 
seek, among other things, to create rights management infrastructures for 
information goods that respect and seek to preserve user privacy.99 Such 
infrastructures would have three components, 'which map to the three 
types ofDRM functionality discussed in Part H.B. 
The first component of value-sensitive design for DRM would involve 
investigation and development of flexible restrictions that minimize or re-
duce direct constraints on intellectual consumption within private spaces. 
Conceptually, direct restrictions on user behavior implicate (at least) two 
97. See Batya Friedman, Daniel C. Howe & Edward Felten, Informed Consent in the 
Mozilla Browser: Implementing Value-Sensitive Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH 
HAWAII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES (2002), available at http:// 
dlib2.computer.orgiconferenlhicssI1435/pdfl14350247.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2003); 
Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn, Jr. & Alan Boming, Value Sensitive Design: Theory and 
Methods, UW CSE TECHNICAL REpORT (Feb. 12,2001), http://www.ischool.washington 
.edulvsd/vsd-theory-methods-tr.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2003); Batya Friedman, Value-
Sensitive Design: A Research Agenda for Information Technology (Aug. 23, 1999), at 
http://www.ischool.washington.edulvsd/VSD_Research_ Agenda.pdf (last visited Mar. 
31,2003); see also BATYA FRIEDMAN, ED., HUMAN VALUES AND THE DESIGN OF COM-
PUTER TECHNOLOGY (1997) (collecting essays and case studies that explore the intersec-
tions between human values and technical design). 
98. See supra Part II.B.l; see also Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future ofDigi-
tal Rights Management: A Roadmap of Emerging Legal Problems (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) (arguing that DRM technologies can take many possible 
forms, and that demonizing "DRM" oversimplifies the policy problems that society must 
confront). 
99. For an argument that DRM infrastructures also should be designed to preserve 
user privileges available under copyright law, see Burk & Cohen, supra note 64. 
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opposing values. IOO One is the strong presumption in favor of intellectual 
privacy, in both its informational and spatial entailments. Under this pre-
sumption, an information provider has no legitimate interest in controlling 
or even knowing about certain types of uses of intellectual goods within 
private spaces. The other is the generally held belief, grounded in both 
economic and noneconomic policy considerations, that information pro-
viders do have a legitimate interest in controlling widespread commercial 
copying, and that this interest may extend in some circumstances to con-
trolling private copying in order to prevent it from reaching a certain criti-
cal mass. Technically, then, the challenge lies in developing technical sys-
tems that preserve both enough privacy for users and enough control for 
rights owners. 
Although reconciling these competing values presents a significant de-
sign challenge, the idea that functionality restrictions might be designed to 
preserve (a degree of) flexibility for private access and copying, while si-
multaneously protecting information providers against large-scale com-
mercial copying, is not novel. One example of such a technology is the 
serial copy management system mandated by the Audio Home Recording 
Act, which allows the production of perfect first-generation copies but 
causes significant quality degradation in subsequent generations. 101 An-
other example is the DMCA' s requirement that analog videocassette re-
corders be designed to allow consumers to time-shift some kinds of televi-
sion programming. 102 Elsewhere, Dan Burk and I have argued that flexible 
restrictions similar to these are necessary to preserve basic user privileges 
established under copyright law, such as fair use.103 For the reasons dis-
cussed in Part ILB.l, flexible or "imperfect" restrictions on the functional-
ity of digital copies also would operate to preserve user privacy. A careful, 
iterative methodology, incorporating participation by the full range of in-
terested parties, could help designers negotiate the challenges entailed in 
implementing planned imperfection. 
Value-sensitive design for DRM also would investigate methods of 
building in limits on monitoring and profiling of individual users. Because 
most businesses need to collect and retain some information about their 
100. Obviously there are others, including policies favoring access to and reuse of 
infonnation for reasons independent of privacy. The discussion in the text is intended to 
be illustrative, not comprehensive. 
101. 17 U.S.c. § 1002 (2000). For a brief description of the serial copy management 
system mandated by the statute, see Edward Samuels, Why Can't I Make Copies from 
Copies of My CDs?, available at http://www.gigalaw.comlarticlesI2001-aIVsamuels-
2001-04-all.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003). 
102. 17 U.S.c. § 1201(k)(2). 
103. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 64, at 54-70. 
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customers to manage orders, payments, and deliveries, technological lim-
its on data collection and use cannot fully substitute for other, human-
implemented safeguards. Nonetheless, DRM systems may be designed 
either to minimize or to maximize data collection, retention, extraction and 
use. To preserve the intellectual privacy of information users, DRM design 
should incorporate minimization principles.104 In the cases where real-time 
monitoring of user conduct is deemed to provide some significant non-
privacy-related benefit,105 designers should consider whether the desired 
benefit can be achieved without capturing the precise identity of the user, 
or without tying users to content. 10 If not, and if the implementation ulti-
mately chosen must reflect a choice between the benefit and user privacy, 
that choice should be made explicitly, and should be documented so that 
later designers, regulators, and courts can understand the tradeoffs in-
volved. 
Finally, a value-sensitive design approach to DRM technologies would 
consider the desirability of implementing limitations on self-help. For ex-
ample, after weighing the full spectrum of values implicated by auto-
mated, punitive enforcement actions, designers might conclude that digital 
content files should never be programmed to self-destruct, or to deny ac-
cess entirely, upon detecting impermissible actions by users. Alternatively, 
104. Minimization of data collection and use is a keystone of internationally-agreed 
fair information practices. See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 75, 'at 15; Joel R. Reiden-
berg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. 
REv. 1315, 1325-29 (2000). Partial research agendas for the project of incorporating 
minimization principles into the design of DRM systems are set forth in Joan Fei-
genbaum et al. ,Privacy Engineeringfor Digital Rights Management Systems, 2320 LEC-
TURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCI. 76 (2002), available at http://www.cs.yale.edulhomes/jfi 
FFSS.pdf (last visited May 5, 2003); Larry Korba & Steve Kenny, Towards Meeting the 
Privacy Challenge: Adapting DRM, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2002 ACM WORKSHOP ON 
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (Nov. 2002), available at http://crypto.standford.edul 
DRM20021K0rbaKennyDRM20021.pdf (last visited May 4, 2003); Deirdre Mulligan & 
Aaron Burstein, Supporting Limits on Copyright Exclusivity in a Rights Expression Lan-
guage Standard, at 15-16 (Aug. 13, 2002), at http://www.law.berkeley.edulcenpro/ 
samuelsoniprojects/drml20020906-0ASIS-SLTPPC-EPIC.pdf (last visited May 4,2003). 
105. As one example of such a benefit, Feigenbaum et aI. cite traffic and quality-of-
service modeling. See Feigenbaum et aI., supra note 104, at 13. A desire to generate and 
sell profiles of users' intellectual preferences, in contrast, is privacy-related (albeit in-
versely) and would not count. 
106. See, e.g., Feigenbaum et aI., supra note 104, at 17-19; Latanya Sweeney, Pri-
vacy and Confidentiality, in Particular, Computational Disclosure Control, at http:// 
privacy.cs.cmu.edulpeople/sweeney/confidentiality.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (de-
scribing research program to develop theoretical models and tools for de-identification 
and anonymization of information in electronic databases). 
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they might conclude that denial of access should be permissible, but only 
in certain clearly defined and extreme circumstances. 
These proposals are necessarily quite general. Whether they would op-
erate to guarantee meaningful levels of privacy for information users 
would depend upon the specific details of their implementation. Nor are 
the specific suggestions offered here necessarily the only or the best ones; 
an expert in the relevant technological fields could undoubtedly think of 
others. The point is simply that a value-sensitive design methodology ex-
poses "DRM" as a concept that is susceptible of a wide range of meanings. 
Understanding the DRM design process as (necessarily) value-driven, and 
undertaking a thorough analysis of all of the values implicated by tech-
nologies for automated management of rights in intellectual goods, are 
essential first steps toward ensuring that design priorities shift to accom-
modate a broader range of human and social priorities. 
B. Implementing a Value-Sensitive Design Process 
Identifying the possibility of value-sensitive design for DRM is only 
half the battle. For privacy-regarding DRM technologies to move from the 
pages of academic articles onto the drawing board and ultimately into the 
marketplace, those who participate in or underwrite real-world design 
processes need incentives to expand their frames of reference. Law has a 
role to play here as well, although it is a very different role from that dis-
cussed in Part III. Law's role in structuring DRM standard-setting proc-
esses is to ensure that the formulation of technical standards by market 
actors takes public values, including privacy values, into account. 
If, as several advocacy organizations have urged, the law were to spec-
ify a "bill of rights" for users of information goods, this would constrain 
DRM development initiatives to focus on public values as well as private 
ones. \07 In particular, rights of intellectual privacy could be specified at a 
sufficiently high level of generality to avoid dictating the choice of techni-
cal standards, while still conveying important information about the sub-
stance of the protection to be afforded. Thus, following the model set forth 
above, rights of intellectual privacy would include: the right not to be sub-
jected to (unreasonably) intrusive constraints on the use of intellectual 
goods within private spaces; rights against monitoring of intellectual con-
sumption and profiling based on intellectual preferences; and, in at least 
107. See, e.g., DigitaIConsumer.Org, at http://www.digitalconsumer.org (last visited 
Apr. 16,2003). I am using the term "law" very generally here to encompass both legisla-
tion and regulation. A digital consumer's bill of rights could come from Congress, but it 
could also come from the FTC pursuant to its mandate to regulate "unfair" practices in 
commerce. See supra Part IILA.2. 
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some circumstances, the right not to be subjected to electronic self-help 
that would disable access to lawfully acquired infonnation goods. Devel-
opment of technical standards and processes to effectuate these rights 
would be the content industries' affair. 
Vigilant defenders of market ordering will object that this proposal 
improperly injects government into a process-standards development-
that is quintessentially of, by, and for the market. It takes but a moment's 
reflection to see that this objection is simply the first cousin once removed 
of the old argument for market ordering of privacy rights. If the first-order 
"market for £rivacy" cannot accurately reflect the variety of values placed 
on privacy, l 8 it is difficult to imagine how a second-order market for pri-
vacy standards, derived by inference from the first-order market for pri-
vacy, could possibly do so. Even assuming that the first-order market for 
privacy actually worked, a hypothetical second-order market for privacy 
standards would entail a number of additional complications. 
First, the relevant market is not simply the "market for privacy" or the 
"market for privacy standards," but also the market for DRM-protected 
content and DRM technologies capable of rendering the content. In the 
first instance, that market is not an end-user market at all, but rather a 
market that consists of intermediary licensors and distributors of digital 
content. Although users have repeatedly shown that they will reward en-
trepreneurs who provide them with freedom and flexibility to use, manipu-
late, copy, and redistribute digital content, the costs of providing that free-
dom have risen sharply in the wake of a string of highly-publicized con-
tributory infringement lawsuits against MP3.com, Napster, Sonicblue, and 
other innovators. 109 Increasingly, therefore, the rational strategy is to li-
cense content subject to DRM restrictions dictated by content providers, 
regardless of whether the intermediary might otherwise prefer a different 
strategy. 
Second, the market for DRM technologies is also the market for DRM 
standards. Many copyright owners lack the technical expertise to develop 
DRM standards themselves, and must commission or convince others to 
do it for them. This means that end users and intermediaries are not the 
only customers in the market for DRM technologies; in the case of DRM 
108. See supra Part III.A.2. 
109. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 
2002 Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 28,500 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Jim Hu, Sonicblue Seeks Bank-
ruptcy Protection, CNET NEWS.COM (Mar. 21, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-
1047 -993647 .html. 
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standards, which precede market availability of DRM-protected content 
both conceptually and chronologically, the copyright industries are the 
customers. As DRM standards penetrate more deeply into general purpose 
software and hardware, this dynamic becomes a bit more complicated; for 
example, developers of computer operating systems and microprocessors 
must satisfy many constituencies. Many technology companies, however, 
also seek to avoid "technological mandates" handed down by the govern-
ment, and appear to perceive voluntary DRM development efforts as the 
lesser of two evils. IID 
Third, assuming that the average end user could easily penetrate the 
relative opacity of most mass-market computing infrastructures and master 
the complex technical terminology ofDRM, market processes are not well 
suited to enable end users to exert positive, as opposed to negative, influ-
ence on the design of technical standards. The market that end users en-
counter in the first instance is the market for DRM-protected content. In 
that market, one can refuse to buy or can switch from one provider to an-
other, but there are no mechanisms to allow one to communicate as a pro-
spective matter the precise level of functionality that one wants. And be-
cause DRM technologies are network technologies, III it will become in-
creasingly difficult for dissenters to opt out. The more deeply embedded in 
software and hardware DRM functionality becomes, the harder it will be 
to avoid by purchasing noncompliant equipment. Particularly as more and 
more desired features and services are bundled with DRM restrictions, the 
costs of opting out may rapidly come to outweigh the benefits. 
DRM standards processes offer an opportunity for more reflective par-
ticipation in the debate over DRM but, at least as currently constituted, 
still are not good vehicles for the incorporation of public values into DRM 
design. To the average end user of information goods, standards processes 
are arcane and relatively inaccessible proceedings. Organizations repre-
senting end users and other noncommercial interests have begun to take an 
interest in DRM standard-setting. I 12 At present, however, their participa-
110. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Antipiracy Detente Announced, CNET NEWS.COM 
(Jan. 14, 2003), at http://news.com.coml2100-1023-980633.html. 
Ill. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479 (1998). 
112. See, e.g., Elect. Privacy Info. Ctr., Digital Rights Management and Privacy, at 
http://www.epic.orglprivacy/dnn/default.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (providing in-
formation on EPIC's submission to the OASIS Rights Language Technical Committee 
and its response to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking (NPRM) on broadcast flag standards); Mulligan & Burstein, supra 
note 104 (submission by the Samuelson Law, Technology, and Public Policy Clinic at the 
University of California, Berkeley, to the OASIS Rights Language Technical Commit-
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tion in these processes is largely on the sufferance of the content and tech-
nology industries. Not all standards processes include end user representa-
tion, and even in those that do, there is no assurance that end user griev-
ances, once aired, will prospectively shape the standards that are brought 
to market. 113 
All of this tends to suggest that to enable a genuinely inclusive, value-
sensitive design process for DRM standards and technologies, some actor 
external to these markets must identify and maintain the centrality of the 
relevant public values. I do not wish to be interpreted as arguing that the 
law should mandate the content of technical standards for DRM technolo-
gies, or that government actors would be good at supervising such a proc-
ess. Government can be rather good, though, at mandating non-technical 
standards. In the non-digital world, we call these non-technical standards 
simply "rights" and "duties," and have long recognized that (at a fairly 
high level of abstraction) rights and duties set the parameters for markets. 
In the digital world, where technical architectures acquire greater regula-
tory force, an effective formulation of legal rights and duties must state 
(among other things) the values that technical standards should be de-
signed to enable--or simply preserve. I 14 
tee); Public Knowledge, Broadcast Flag Filings, at http://www.publicknowledge.org/ 
reading-roomldocuments/admin-filings/broadcast-flag/filings.php#PKfiling (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2003) (submissions by Public Knowledge/Consumer's Union in response to the 
FCC's broadcast flag NPRM). 
113. The DRM standards project sponsored by the Organization for the Advancement 
of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) emphasizes open, non-proprietary stan-
dards and is open to all interested parties. See OASIS, Rights Language TC, at 
http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_ home.php?wg_ abbrev=rights (last visited Apr. 
1, 2003). Other standards projects, including the copyright industry-driven Copy Protec-
tion Technical Working Group, at http://www.cptwg.org (last visited Apr. 1,2003), and 
the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance initiated by Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Hewlett 
Packard, and Compaq, at http://www.trustedcomputing.org/tcpaasp4/index.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2003), appear to have open membership policies, but only for corporate 
members. Many other DRM standards projects utilize neither open standards nor open 
membership. These include the motion picture industry's DVD Content Control Associa-
tion, Microsoft's Next Generation Secure Content Base project, Intel's LaGrande project, 
and a host of smaller private efforts to develop proprietary DRM technologies. See Chris 
Gaither, Intel Chip to Include Antipiracy Features, Some Still Fear Privacy of Users Will 
Be Violated, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10,2002, at C3; Robert Lemos, What's in a Name? 
Not Palladium, CNET NEWS. COM (Jan. 24, 2003), at http://news.com.coml2100-1001-
982127.htm1?tag=fd_top; DVD Copy Control Association, at http:/www.dvdcca.org (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2003). 
114. Cf LESSIG, supra note 17 (arguing that constitutional doctrine must be sensitive 
to the ways in which code regulates behavior); Reidenberg, supra note 17 (arguing that 
law- and policymakers should understand and exploit the regulatory functions of code). 
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v. CONCLUSION 
DRM technologies may represent the future of information access and 
use, but their design and implementation are still open questions. A shift to 
an information environment characterized by pervasive constraints, uni-
versal monitoring, and automated self-help would severely undermine in-
tellectual privacy values. Instead, in the era of DRM, law and technology 
together must share responsibility for protecting intellectual privacy. Law 
can fulfill its responsibility in its usual fashion, by defining individual 
rights and correlative obligations, but to do so effectively it must come to 
terms with both the inadequacy of "markets for privacy" and the central 
role played by DRM standards in defining rights and obligations as a prac-
tical matter. Technology can fulfill its responsibility to the extent that its 
designers and their customers in the content industries practice both inclu-
siveness and restraint, but to do so effectively they must come to terms 
with the importance of law, and more broadly of public policy and public 
values, in establishing design parameters. The time to undertake these 
tasks is now, before highly restrictive technical proposals and highly per-
missive legal responses harden into legacies that may prove far more diffi-
cult to dislodge. 
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